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Intimations of a Spiritual New Age:
III. Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology
of Numinous/Being Experience and the “Other Beginning”
of a Futural Planetary Spirituality
Harry T. Hunt

Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada
The phenomenology of numinous or Being-experience in the later Heidegger is
the focus in this third in a series of papers on a group of independent figures—
also including Jung, Reich, Toynbee, Teilhard de Chardin, and Simone Weil—who
beginning in the crisis years of the 1930s envisioned versions of a futural “New Age”
spirituality to address a globalizing materialism and its disenchantments—and so
also creating a context for much of contemporary transpersonal and consciousness
studies. A preliminary consideration of Heidegger in the contexts of transpersonal
psychology, religious studies, the macro-histories of Toynbee and Sorokin, James on
“pure experience,” and spirituality as intelligence must also lead to some reckoning
with Heidegger’s disastrous initial involvement with National Socialism. Considered
here in terms of a spiritual metapathology of narcissistic inflation/grandiosity, it was
his way past this episode that led from the mid 1930s on into his radical critique of
a globalizing technology of universal commodification and to an answering futural
potential for a spiritual “Other Beginning” and “last god”—re-sacralizing humanity
for the “guardianship” and “sheltering” of planet and life.
Keywords: New Age, globalization, Being-experience, Dasein, this-worldly mysticism,
ideational/classic/sensate eras, awe, thatness vs. whatness, social-personal vs. thing
intelligences, anthropomorphism, homelessness, schizoid dilemma, pre-Socratic physis,
logos, aletheia, Other Beginning, Event of Appropriation, Inceptuality, Clearing, releasement
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his study of Heidegger’s phenomenology of
spirituality as the essence of a creative human
intelligence and his analysis of a potential
“Other Beginning” for a future planetary spirituality
is the third in this series on a group of independent
figures—in the crisis years from the 1930s into the
1950s—who articulated overlapping visions of
possible future resolutions to what the sociologist
Max Weber (1922/1963) saw as a “disenchantment”
of traditional meaning and purpose now intensified
in the increasing globalization of an historically
unprecedented materialist-sensate economy and its
exclusively “instrumentalist” values (see also Hunt,
2017, 2018ab).
In addition to the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) these
key figures would include the psychologists Carl

Jung (1961) and Wilhelm Reich (1949/1973), the
macro-historians Arnold Toynbee (1946, 1957) and
Pitrim Sorokin (1957), along with the more explicit
spiritualities of such as Teilhard de Chardin (1959),
Simone Weil (1947/2002; Hunt, 2017), Krishnamurti
(1973/1987; Hunt, 2014), and Gurdjieff (1975;
Hunt, 2003) with their potentially futural versions
of an essentialized Christianity, Vedanta, and
Sufism.1 While they all offer intuitions of a more
distant Age of spiritual renewal, they also became
direct precursors and the larger context for what
might be termed a present transpersonal Era of
more specific empirical studies of psychedelics,
meditation, neo-shamanism, and consciousness
studies.
The consideration of the later Heidegger as
one of these New Age figures—with his intuitions of
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Being-experience as the cognitive-noetic meaning
of numinous-mystical feeling—might indeed
seem questionable in light of his early allegiance
to Hitler’s National Socialism, as Nazi Rector of
his university in 1933/4. This has not surprisingly
caused some to question the entire basis of his
phenomenology of Dasein or human existence set
forth in his seminal Being and Time (Heidegger,
1927/1962; see Wolin, 1990; Hunt, 2003,
and discussion below). Nonetheless, his rapid
disillusion with National Socialism as spiritual “new
beginning”—an enthusiasm initially shared by many
conservative neo-romantics at the time—led to his
abrupt resignation. What followed between 1934
and about 1947 was a series of lecture courses,
notebooks, and extended writings, some only
recently published, in which he critiqued what he
saw as the “machination” of modern technology
and its ruthless commodification of both nature
and humanity, which he came to see as common
to the mass political movements of the 20th century.
These writings also put forward what he saw as
a potential spiritual renewal based on a futural
global sacralizing of Being-as-such. This planetary
Other Beginning was based on his original reinterpretations of a pre-Socratic First Beginning of
Western spirituality, which he, and others, have
compared to Taoism and Buddhism (Guenther, 1989;
May, 1996; Parkes, 1987). He also suggested a more
regionally specific re-sacralization of nature and its
mythology, which he derived from the nature poetry
of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). This amounts to
a kind of neo-shamanism similar to the related reenchantments of Emerson and Thoreau.
Especially in light of the contemporary
“populisms” of nationalist, fundamentalist, and
narrowly ethno-centric reactions against the
pressures and resentments of an accelerating
economic globalization—a reactivity anticipated
by Teilhard de Chardin (1964) as an inevitable
way station on the path to any wider respiritualization—Heidegger’s way out of his
earlier National Socialist enthusiasm and forward
into an original this-worldly mysticism and
ecological re-sacralization will have its own renewed relevance—both in the mistake and in its
potential answer.
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Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Spirituality
as Essence of the Human Condition
t is the cross referencing of Heidegger with these
other New Age precursors, and the larger issues
of social theory, spirituality, and the nature of
consciousness this raises, that can best contextualize
his unique understanding of Being-experience as
the noetic core of the numinous and its relevance
for contemporary transpersonal studies. It seems
especially significant that Heidegger, with
Wittgenstein one of the two greatest philosophers
of the twentieth century, and both sharing a
major impact in ongoing debates over the unique
conceptual foundations of the human sciences
(Hunt, 1995, 2005), offers a phenomenology of the
transpersonal at the very core of his phenomenology
of human existence.
Being-Experience and the Numinous:
A Philosophy for Transpersonal Studies
Following the earlier descriptive naturalism
of Being and Time, Heidegger’s phenomenological
writings from the late 1930s show a growing alignment of his understanding of Being-experience, as
the direct intuition of the sheer thatness of Being-assuch, with Rudolf Otto’s (1917/1958) more sensoryaffective dimensions of the numinous—Otto’s
term for the feeling aspect of mystical experience
also so influential on Jung (1961). For Otto these
experiences of wonder, awe, and the uncanny, also
the empirical focus of recent empirical research on
awe (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007), have been
historically schematized in the multiple doctrines of
a spiritual Absolute: variously understood as God,
Void, Spirit, Brahman. For Heidegger Being-as-such
becomes the deeper noetic meaning implied within
these schematizations.
Otto, a Protestant theologian drawn to a
comparative phenomenology of the numinous as
the felt core of the world religions, distinguishes
within that a first dimension of the mysterium as
wonder, fascination, mystery, while Heidegger
similarly comes to describe his Being-experience
with terms such as “wonder,” “awe,” “amazement,”
and “marvelling” at an ineffable “wholly other”
(Heidegger, 1942/1992, pp. 62, 75; 1939/2006, p.
241). Where Otto describes his second dimension as
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the tremendum, with its sense of the overpowering,
dread, and uncanny strangeness, Heidegger begins
to write of the experience of Being in terms of
“shock,” “shudder,” and the “uncanny” (Heidegger,
1942/1992, p. 101; 1938/1994, p. 133; 1940/2015,
p. 89). Here Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s own
descriptions of a “rapture” that “explodes” the
very subjectivity of the subject in an “essence of
joy” that must be “strong enough” to bear “being
terrified” (Heidegger, 1937/1979, p. 123; 1940/2015,
p. 89)—a duality of peak experience also described
by Maslow (1962). Finally, Otto’s third dimension
of dependency, humility, or “creature feeling”
is echoed in Heidegger’s descriptions of Beingexperience in terms of “diffidence,” “indigence,”
and “essential poverty” (Heidegger, 1941/2017,
p. 93; 1942/2013, p. 182).
For Rudolf Otto, as for James (1902) and
Jung (1961), the “wholly other” quality of numinous/
mystical experience will at its extreme entail an utter
“ineffability.” Here Heidegger describes a “keeping
silent” (Heidegger, 1938/1994, p. 162) such that all
verbal expression becomes at best “indicative” and
poetic—full of overt self contradiction and paradox.
Thus for Heidegger Being-experience can only be
conveyed as a coincidence of opposites. It is at
once the most “empty” and the most “excessive”
and complete; the most “said” and “obvious” (as
in the ubiquity of the word “is”) and yet the most
“concealed” and “mysterious”; the most “universal”
yet the most “singular” and “unique”; and “both
utterly void and most abundant” (Heidegger,
1946/1982, p. 193; 1941/1993, pp. 42–57). Heidegger
will also describe Being, in its “withdrawal” behind
the “gift” of its “welling forth,” as an ostensible
“nothing”—and so reminiscent of Buddhist void and
the “godhead” of Meister Eckhart—one of his major
early influences (Heidegger, 1956/1958; 1962/1972).
The mantra-like repetitions of these
phrasings from his then unpublished notebooks
(Ponderings II–VI, Ponderings VII–XI, Ponderings XII–
XV), lecture courses (Hölderlin’s Hymns: Germania
and the Rhine; Parmenides; Hölderlin’s Hymn: The
Ister; Hölderlin’s Hymn: Remembrance; Heraclitus),
and then unpublished books (Contributions
to Philosophy (of the Event); Mindfulness; The
History of Beyng; The Event) are all written in an
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Numinous Experience

experientially evocative manner. These are the main
sources for this present analysis, and offer the most
direct support for the relevance of his later work as
a phenomenology of spirituality and a philosophical
foundation for transpersonal studies.
Also central here is the link between Maslow,
Almaas, and Gurdjieff on the transformation in
sense of self in peak and ecstatic experience and
Heidegger on Dasein—the essence of human
existence as our self-aware “being there”—first
developed in Being and Time (1927/1962). There
he outlined the existential a prioris of the human
condition as a being-in-the-world, as oneself, with
others, ahead in time toward death—that openness
conferring the sense of Being to which we can either
“authentically” awaken or suffer a more everyday
“forgetfulness.” Later he would write this as Dasein, connoting the direct experience of a presenceopenness-wonder in which one’s self identity
becomes Being itself. That would be the beginning
of the futural sense of identity that could prepare his
“Other Beginning” for a planetary spiritual renewal
(Heidegger, 1938/2012, pp. 277–279).
Heidegger is on much the same ground
here as Maslow (1962) on one’s identity as Being in
peak experiences and self actualization. Heidegger,
in discussing Nietzsche’s personal experiences of
ecstasy notes this same transformation of self-hood
as Being:
A being beyond oneself, hence a coming to
oneself in the supreme lucidity of Being…
the heightening of life itself…a transformation
in which the supreme lawfulness of Dasein
becomes visible. (Heidegger, 1937/1979, pp.
212, 216)
Almaas (1988) similarly describes the experience
of “essential identity” or the “point” as one’s felt
identity as Being, as also for Jung (1951/1959) on
the Self, and as opening for Almaas into the more
formless transpersonal states.2 Heidegger’s Da-sein
also shares a conceptual framework with Gurdjieff
(1975) on “self remembering,” as the cultivation
of a here and now sense of presence that opens
to the intuition of Great Being, and, with the early
Heidegger, energized by the contemplation of
death.
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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Heidegger’s awakening to Da-sein and
its similarity to the Being-experiences in Maslow,
Almaas, Jung, and Gurdjieff places them together
as expressions of what Max Weber (1922/1963)
termed “inner-worldly” mysticism—to be contrasted
with the more detached “other-worldly” mysticisms
and the socially driven propheticisms. It was innerworldly mysticism that Troeltsch (1931/1960) and
Weber saw as the form of re-sacralization most in
tune with the individualized, capitalist West (see
also Hunt, 2003). More specifically for Heidegger,
Being, as the noetic core of ecstatic states, is that
schematization of the numinous most consistent
with a civilization prioritizing a sensate empiricism
of the “factual,” since it is the felt attunement to a
sensed “thatness” running through all of physical and
social-personal being. We really do exist, such that
“Being-experience” becomes not a “representation”
of something, but the fully embodied reality
or “facticity” of presence-openness that is the
numinous.
Heidegger and Religious Studies
Both the very early Heidegger (1919/2004,
1920/2013) and the older philosopher of ethics
Max Scheler (1923/1960), inspired by their
mentor Edmund Husserl, sought to articulate a
“transcendental phenomenology” of the human lifeworld as the next step in Husserl’s phenomenology
of consciousness. Wilhelm Dilthey (1911/1960),
also a major early influence on Heidegger, similarly
sought a “deep structure” for the human sciences of
“understanding,” which would have to be indirect or
“indicative,” since unlike the “explanatory” physical
sciences there is no objective “outside” to humanity,
only its indirect expressions in history and culture.
Both Heidegger and Scheler independently came
to the insight that this categorical phenomenology
for human existence already existed—expressively
amplified outward in its most inclusive form in the
world religions (Spiegelberg, 1965; Hunt, 2012).3
Thus in the years leading up to Being and
Time in 1927 Heidegger derived his categories of
human being-in-the-world by a “de-mythologizing”
or “naturalizing” re-description of the Christianity
of Augustine, Duns Scotus, Meister Eckhart, and
Kierkegaard. Christian love became the existential
structure of care; original sin became the sense of

4

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

inherent flaw, “falleness,” and forgetfulness of Being;
and faith in eternal life the “authenticity” of being
ahead of oneself in time toward the open unknown of
death (Crowe, 2006; Kisiel, 1993; van Buren, 1994).
Certainly one might wonder whether a
similar “naturalizing” of Taoism or Vedanta would
have generated these same universalizing forms of
humanness, and Heidegger’s later use of the preSocratics instead of Christianity did elicit shifts
in emphasis. However, given the generality and
orienting intention of these deep structures—beingin-the-world, as oneself, with others, ahead into
the care and openness of time—it would seem that
while starting from Taoism would have elicited more
emphasis on his eigenwelt (world-of-one’s-own)
or from Confucianism, more on mitwelt (worldwith-others), neither would have led to anything
completely “other.” Indeed, the validity of something
like Heidegger’s Dasein is needed to help explain
how cultural anthropology is even possible.
The central implication is that if the
existentials of being human are most fully derivable
from religion, this also meant for Heidegger that
religious/mystical experience must be a capacity
inherent to Dasein—indeed as its “fullest” self-aware
expression. A being with the structure of Heidegger’s
Dasein would have to be capable of something like
numinous experience. Being-experience becomes
the closest our self awareness as such can come to
the essence of human being-in-the-world. It makes
spirituality not just a faculty of mind but mind-assuch:
Man himself is that being that has the distinctive
characteristic of being addressed by Being itself,
in such a way that in the self showing of man…
the uncanny itself, god, appears. (Heidegger,
1942/1992, p. 104)
Heidegger’s approach to this intrinsic
spirituality is neither purely “perennialist” in
the sense of Huston Smith (1976), nor purely
“constructivist” in the sense of Katz (1978), but
more “interactionist”—as with Scheler (1923/1960),
Martin Buber (1947), and indeed Otto himself.
While Being as the noetic meaning of Otto’s
numinous sounds at times like a perennial core, its
“deep structure” of wonder, awe, gratitude, humility,
Hunt

and communality is as general and unspecified as
Heidegger’s original categories of Dasein. For the
later Heidegger it is the schematization of Beingexperience, always shaped by culture, history, and
society, that creates the “History of Being” he will
trace forward into the possibilities of a futural Other
Beginning and last god. Such a planetary renewal
would then be a sort of pulling forward of the deep
structures of the numinous through schematizations
specifically reflective of the modern disenchantment
of tradition and its economic and technological
commodifications of nature and humanity, that is, as
uniquely emergent in the currency of our unfolding
world history. It would follow that the schematization
of the numinous in this age of globalization would
favor the “facticity” term “Being” over a previous
Absolute, Spirit, One, or God.4
Most simply put, to say that God is everything
or in everything raises all the traditional theological
debates over pantheism, dualism, monism vs. theism.
For Heidegger, knowledgeable in both medieval
scholasticism and contemporary mathematical
physics, to say that Being is the essence of all
things—a primary thatness running under, through,
and ahead of all specific whatnesses—is true by
definition. But then to say that this Being-as-such is
the holy, and that fully felt it becomes the numinous,
is to posit a spirituality of radical immanence—a
non dual re-integration of humanity and universe
that could then become the unitive meaning for the
globalized sensate-material age to come.
Heidegger and Social Theory:
The Multiple Histories of Being
One way to better understand Heidegger’s
rather unique “deconstruction” of the entire
history of Western civilization and its futural
globalization—in terms of an originary sense of
Beyng (the English for his use of the archaic German
Seyn instead of Sein) and its progressive distortion
and loss—is to contextualize his Beyng-History
within the broader context of other macro-social
theorists such as Sorokin (1957), Toynbee (1957),
and Weber (1922/1963). The latter all share an
understanding of repeating cycles within the more
linear socio-economic development of the major
world civilizations—between eras or maximum
sacralization and its countering secularization.
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Numinous Experience

Heidegger (1935/1961, 1946/1975, 1942/1992,
1944/2018) locates his own First Beginning of a
Western sacralization of Being-as-such in the preSocratic nexus of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and
Parmenides, which he will later compare to Taoism
and Buddhism as its closest Axial parallels. This
First Beginning he sees as gradually lost within the
categorical certainty and predominance of a narrowly
causal thinking culminating in modern science and
technology. By contrast the pre-Socratics intuit an
underlying unity of nature (physis), thought (logos),
and truth (aletheia or unconcealment). All three
concepts reflect the same “gathered emergence”
of Being as a “welling forth” from a background
“boundlessness.” This “self-unfolding” thereby
“gives” an uncanniness and wonder to all specific
beings, while “withdrawing” behind them in that
very giving in an implicit concealment sensed as the
holy. This for Heidegger becomes the early Greek
sense of astonishment at the “pure shining” and
“radiating light of all specific beings in their uncanny
beauty” (Heidegger, 1942/1992, p. 136).
The emergence and concealment that dwell
in all emerging beings, i.e. Being itself, must
therefore be astonishing to common experience
within everyday dealing with beings….The
astonishing is for the Greeks the simple, the
insignificant, Being itself. The astounding visible
in the asonishing is the uncanny (Heidegger,
1942/1992, p. 101)
Heidegger’s
admittedly
controversial
grounding of Western thought is already its
own form of Weber’s immanent “this-worldly”
mysticism—a first expression of the deeper
renewal now needed as a planetary necessity in
the face of what he feared might be its irreversible
“forgetfulness.” Heidegger traces the breaking up
of this pre-Socratic unity into what he sees as the
characteristically Western dualism of subject and
object, in which truth shifts from “unconcealment”
to a dominating representation and causal control
by a separate mind over an objective world. That
dualism passed through an omnipotent JudeoChristian God of creation and Final Judgement
into its eventual secularization as the modern
Prometheanism of a scientific-technical “calculative
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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thinking” and “will to power.” For Heidegger,
we have ended with an entirely secular, narrowly
defined “anthropomorphism” that reduces Dasein
to a kind of “super animality.” Corresponding to
Weber’s “disenchantment of modernity,” Heidegger
describes a “darkening of the world,” with its
“flight of the gods,” “destruction of the earth,”
“standardization of man,” and “misinterpretation
of the spirit” (Heidegger, 1935/1961, p. 37). Where
the “basic disposition” of the First Beginning was
wonder, that of any futural Other Beginning would
only emerge through a collective acknowledgement
of this contemporary global “unsettlement” and its
new dislocating sense of the uncanny (Heidegger,
1938/2012).
Heidegger’s History of Beyng can best
be contextualized as a larger version of the more
empirical observations of Pitrim Sorokin (1957), the
Russian émigré social theorist who founded Harvard’s
sociology department in the 1940s and 50s. His
major work, Social and Cultural Dynamics, traced
within all major historical civilizations a common
cyclicity between “ideational” or “sacralising” eras
of cultural inspiration and subsequent “sensate”
eras of secularization. The latter result from
inevitable historical changes in the socio-economic
patterns whose resultant dilemmas in living are
no longer resolvable within the original ideational
schematization. Eras of secularization are reflected
in the predominance of materialistic, pragmatic, and
individualistic values—which then may be followed
by fundamentalist ideational revivals, new religious
movements, or a more nihilistic cultural decline.
Compromise “classical” eras can sometimes bridge
these extremes, as in Hellenistic Neo Platonism or
the European Renaissance, wherein the developing
sensate is still contextualized and subordinated
within a larger ideational attunement. Heidegger’s
version becomes one single macro cycle from the
Pre-Socratics to modern technology, with Medieval
Scholasticism as its classicism, and culminating now
in the need for a global spiritual renewal.
Sorokin independently agrees with both
Heidegger and Max Weber, in the latter’s comparative
sociology of the world religions (1922/1963), that the
economic globalization of the modern West seems to
have broken this pattern, perhaps permanently. The
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cyclic theories of Sorokin, Toynbee, and Weber are
very different from the linear development models
of Gebser (1985) and Wilber (1995), stretching from
hunter gatherer shamanism to the present scientific/
informational civilization, while for Sorokin the latter
is the unprecedented intensification and extension of
an otherwise cyclic materialism—with what Weber
saw as its entrenched “disenchantment.” Sorokin
had concluded that by the early 1900s an ideational
re-sacralization was long overdue, based on the
preceding sensate culmination of the “Enlightenment
Project” of reason, instrumentalism, individualism,
and science, ending perhaps in Nietzsche’s
relativism and nihilism. Weber (1905/1958) similarly
wondered if the historically unique “rationalization”
of Western society, its system complexity, associated
with capitalism, technology, and bureaucratization,
would permanently marginalize and suppress
any periodic attempts at “re-enchantment” by
increasingly marginalized sects and cults. Of course
neither Sorokin nor Weber could have anticipated
the run-away self-perpetuation of contemporary
capitalist driven technology with its digitalized
media, automated expert systems, and artificial
intelligence.
Meanwhile Toynbee (1957), aligned with
Heidegger on the inherency of the spiritual in the
human condition, and with his own conroversial
radicalism, pictured world history as a succession
of post-regional “universal states”—Greece, Persia,
Rome, China, and India—whose “point” or deepest
function had been their culminating generation
of a still wider universal religion. Accordingly he
anticipated that the same must eventually follow
from a globalized materialist capitalism—which will
finally have to give rise to its own re-contextualizing
sense of meaning and broader spiritual purpose.
With Weber, he saw modern capitalism as itself the
further secularization of the Christian preoccupation
with the incarnation of soul into a material world
now becoming more and more unbalanced in its
excessive materialism. He thought its futural respiritualization would be a synthesis of JudeoChristian love and Eastern meditation, but one
which would also have to remain consistent with
modern empiricism and its this-worldly values. Here
he turned to the later Henri Bergson (1935/1956)
Hunt

and his understanding of mystical experience as
the direct amplification of an intrinsic “life energy”
or evolutionary “life force”—so close to Wilhelm
Reich’s orgone energy as his “religion of the future”
(Hunt, 2018ab).
While Heidegger (1920/2013) was initially
influenced by Bergson’s “religion as transcendent
life,” he soon came to see that the unique selfaware openness of human Dasein, contrasted
with the “enclosed” worlds of all other living
beings (Heidegger, 1930/1995), meant that Beingexperience was a species-defining calling out of
humanity by Being-as-such—creating a mandate
for our “guardianship” and “sheltering” of life
and planet (Heidegger, 1947/1962). This became
the basis for his Other Beginning and “last god”
(below).
Heidegger, James, and Consciousness Studies
Heidegger
understood
his
intuitive
phenomenology of Dasein, Being, and Beingexperience as the fuller completion of his mentor
Husserl’s analytic phenomenology of consciousness,
which he critiqued as an unintended perpetuation of
a more traditional subject-object dualism. Instead,
Husserl’s intentionality or “aboutness” of immediate
consciousness—so similar to William James (1890)
on its “stream” or onflow—was to be understood
as already rooted in a constitutive being-in-theworld, rather than the other way around (Heidegger,
1973/2003, p. 69). The structure of Dasein, its selfaware presence-openness, makes Being-experience
the nondual potentiality for Being to know/be itself
through that Dasein.
Heidegger’s “thatness” of Being-experience
shining through the myriad “whatnesses” of both
abstract metaphysics and everyday life was a more
intuitive way of conveying what he had termed the
“ontological difference” between Being-as-such
and specific beings, with all their thereby imbued
interest and novelty (Heidegger, 1939/2006,
p. 240). The ontological difference is not a “faculty”
of human nature, but the “basic structure of Dasein
itself” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 369)—and as such
determines an intrinsic humanly defining creativity
most fully expressed in numinous experience. The
wonder/awe/uncanny of this attunement to the
thatness of Being, in making spirituality intrinsic
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Numinous Experience

to the fullness of Dasein, is thereby opposed to
any “God of the gaps” notion that would see
science as the ultimate replacement of a more
vestigial, mythologically expressed and inevitably
disappearing sense of mystery. Instead, the
“wonder” or “strangeness” that things are at all
continues to shine through all levels of their more
specified explanation.
It is interesting that the later William James
arrives at a similar “thatness” underlying both his
“stream of consciousness” and all that it is “about.”
Influenced by his own phenomenology of mystical
experience in his Varieties of Religious Experience
(1902), he describes a “pure experience” or “thatness”
implicit within the “thisness” of consciousness and
“whatness” of world:
The instant field of the present is at all times
what I call the “pure” experience. It is only
virtually or potentially either object or subject
as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified
actuality, or existence, a simple that. (James,
1912/1971, p. 15)
With Heidegger, it can be sensed as:
Wonder over the general fact of being,…it is only
familiarity that blocks it. Not only that anything
should be but that this very thing should be, is
mysterious. (James, 1911/1996, p. 39)
In his accounts of nitrous-oxide experience James
had already intuited this more primary sensing of
being and time. He describes a “limitless, infinite
feeling…a sense of existence” (James, 1890,
p. 273) that feels “always having been there” and
with no conceivable end: “The now…exfoliating
out of itself yet never escapes” (James, 1902,
p. 351). Amplified as such this becomes the “timeless”
and “eternal” quality of mystical experience. James
is intuiting here his own version of a nondual unity
or monism (Bricklin, 2010) that is also fundamental
to Heidegger and Eastern thought.
Heidegger stresses that this wonder/mystery/
astonishment of Being-experience is not to be
confused with a more ordinary novelty and surprise
at the myriad “this’s” and “what’s” of the everyday
life-world. Its “unusualness” or astonishment are
not that of other “unfamiliar” or “exceptional”
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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experiences (Heidegger, 1939/2006), p. 110)—but
something more intrinsic.
Only that which is unrepeatable … is the
innermost law of Beyng. (Heidegger, 1938/2016,
p. 202)
In short, Being is always unique. As such it becomes
the inner form or deep structure of astonishment—
an intrinsic creativity of Dasein that separates us
from other living beings. Here Heidegger naturalizes
that more traditional Christian discontinuity of
humanity and other species, contrastive against a
purely Darwinian evolutionary continuity.
One could also add that considered in a
wider organismic context, Otto’s numinous with
its wonder and awe of the mysterium, the wholly
other power of the tremendum, and resulting sense
of radical dependency, can be seen as the purely
abstract form—brought forward as such into self
aware experience—of the “orientation response,”
in which animals exposed to novelty initially react
with an absorbed fascination and “still reaction”
prepatory to flight/flight or actual exploration (Hunt,
1995). Indeed Heidegger confirms such an extension
by adding to his primary “wonder” and “uncanny”
a concomitant “shock,” “stillness,” “restraint,” and
“shudder” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, pp. 14, 18).
Here Being-experience would become the inner
form of the organismic orientation response, but
played through the entirety of our human selfaware cognitive/affective schemata, and so bringing
forward an intrinsic creativity in which all and
everything can become sources of “fascination”
and “mystery”—conferring that openness which
Heidegger will term “capability for God.”5
Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Two Cognitions:
Spirituality as Social-Personal Intelligence
A major dimension of Heidegger’s
analysis of Dasein in Being and Time was his
attempt to reconcile Dilthey’s dichotomy between
the intelligence of the sciences, as based on
“explanation” (Erklarung) and grounded in a
causal and mathematical connectivity—and the
humanities, based on empathic interpretation
or “understanding” (Verstehen)—with its most
inclusive expression in the religious-spiritual
traditions. (Bambach, 1995; Kisiel, 1993). For Dilthey
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(1911/1960) the human sciences (and their subject
matter) were correspondingly oxymoronic—based
on the emergent combination of what could be
termed these separate intelligences of thing and
person (Hunt, 2005).
Although the two intelligences are distinct
in terms of their ultimate intentionalities—witness
the increasing distance between C. P. Snow’s (1959)
“two cultures”—this author (Hunt, 2009) has
argued that it is their necessary collisions and partial
integrations that help to constitute the permanent
creativity of human symbolic cognition—in contrast
to their separation in the higher apes and apparently
in more primitive hominids. Heidegger’s (1935/1961)
version of this dynamic interaction and ultimate
incommensurability comes in his inherent “strife” of
“earth”—as natural environment—and “world” of
culture. For Heidegger this strife, most directly felt,
is the uncanny—that most primitive form of Otto’s
numinous. Thus it is of particular interest that Freud,
in his seminal essay The Uncanny (1919/1959),
similarly understands the sense of uncanniness
as the direct crossing of these intelligences of
person and thing. It is the feeling that arises where
physical objects are felt to have the expressive
physiognomies of persons and animals, or persons
are experienced as mechanized and thing-like. The
latter becomes especially characteristic of schizoid
and schizophrenic conditions (Sass, 1998), while
the interpersonal psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan
(1953) considered the extreme of this uncanny
strangeness as the defining emotion of psychotic
onset. Meanwhile for James (1902), Jung (1961), and
Anton Boisen (1936/1962) full mystical experience
becomes the latter’s resolution and healing.
While the major multiple intelligences
(linguistic, artistic, scientific, and mechanical)
can be seen as variously balanced integrations of
these ultimately separate primary intelligences of
person and thing (see Hunt, 2009), these domain
fusions normally entail an originating predominant
context of the social-personal, whether explicit or
implicit—even in science and mathematics. This
predominance, while maximally expressed in the
spiritual traditions, remains determinant throughout
Sorokin’s sensate-materialist eras, to the point of
truism, in the very necessity of social learning,
Hunt

modeling, and mentoring for all knowledge—no
matter how purely quantitative its outer form. Put
most simply, the entirety of Piaget’s sensori-motor
intelligence requires this shared context of “with
others” for its integrated development.6
On the level of the history of cultures,
Sorokin’s ideational and classic eras—as well as
the larger mythic frameworks of nature in shamanic
peoples (Levi-Strauss, 1966)—would make most
explicit and overt this contextual predominance of
social-personal over thing intelligence. Indeed, it
would allow their optimal integration and balancing.
Its outward collapse in Sorokin’s sensate-materialist
eras entails the slipping of the spiritually amplified
social-personal back into the implicit—resulting in
Weberian disenchantment and loss of any larger
sense of meaning. For Heidegger, the present
technological era and its economic globalization
reflects an historically unprecedented skewing
in favor of sensate-materialist “machination,” in
which humanity sees itself more and more through
machine and now digital metaphors.
In the face of that, and despite the semantic
sense of Being as equally inclusive of physical
universe and cultural world, it would appear that
Heidegger’s characterizations of Being-experience
make clear that his futural Other Beginning would
indeed renew the same contextual predominance
of the social-personal found in the traditional world
religions.
Thus, consistent with Gordon Allport’s
(1961) classic account of the “idiographic” nature
of the personal self, Being-experience is described
as “unique,” “specific,” “self-same,” “singular,”
and “alone” (Heidegger, 1932/2015, pp. 113–114,
132; 1938/2012, pp. 51–56). Similarly Heidegger’s
descriptions of Being as a “oneness,” “unity,”
“wholeness,” and “simplicity” echoes the gestalt
psychologist Solomon Asch (1946) on the way
that individual traits in person perception are
spontaneously synthesized into a unique gestalt,
with its sense of a central essence subsuming more
peripheral attributes into one self. Finally, and even
more strikingly, the “appropriation” of Dasein by
Being as a “sheltering” that “holds,” and “safeguards”
(Heidegger, 1945/2010, p. 124)—a “giving” and
“allowing” whose source holds itself back in favor
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Numinous Experience

of that very gifting—is the very essence of the
psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott’s (1971) account of
mother-infant mirroring and nurturance.
This means that Heidegger’s Being—
meeting these long established criteria—is
ultimately a kind of person. If so, does that make his
futural Other Beginning merely anthropomorphic—
as in the projection of personhood within more
traditional religious concepts of God, Absolute, and
the compassion of Buddhist Shunyata. Instead for
Heidegger:
The “anthropomorphic” objection immediately exposes itself to the most pointed counterobjections….Behind it stands the conviction…
that everyone, of course, generally knows what
man is….Does it not rather follow primarily that
before everything, the question must be asked
who is man?...Does man not exist in such a way
that the more primordially he is himself, he is
precisely not…himself? If man, as the being
who is not only itself, becomes the criterion,
then what does humanizing mean? (Heidegger,
1936/1985, pp. 163–164).
For Heidegger the radical openness of Dasein—
metaphorically mirroring and mirrored by all
of Being—means humanity is a “beyond itself”
(Heidegger, 1937/1984, p. 102). As with Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) on the physical metaphoricity
of all cognition, it cannot be clear what becomes
metaphor of what—the universe of us or us of the
universe. The success of modern physics is based
on a language of mathematics that has been seen as
both “real” and a human “construction” (Penrose,
1997). Meanwhile, the generation of humanity and
its spiritual capacity by that universe—its giving forth
of Da-sein—also makes that universe, to this very
degree, anthropomorphic in itself—with humanity
as its self awareness (see also Hunt, 2006).
For Heidegger that leaves open an emerging
ethical choice for that self aware openness between
“guardian” or would-be despot.
Mendacity Interlude
ny consideration of Heidegger as major spiritual
thinker must come to terms with his enthusiastic
service as Nazi Rector of his university in 1933/4.
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National Socialism and Personal Inflation
Although Heidegger was not personally antisemitic (see below), he seems to have fantasized that
he might become a leader of the social revolution
side of National Socialism, which he initially saw as
the potential spiritual renewal of the West (Ott, 1993).
Meeting mainly derision from the more orthodox
Nazi Education Ministry (Farias, 1989), he resigned
abruptly in 1934, privately terming it “the greatest
stupidity of my life” (Petzet, 1993, p. 37). Rejecting the
twin extremes of later criticism that his Nazi period
had no significant relation to his philosophy or that
all his work is thereby rendered Fascist in its entirety
(Wolin, 1990), it remains that the later recovery and
extension of his larger phenomenology of Being
does not mitigate the also insidious quality of a
Nazi allegiance based not on any ideology of racial
supremacy but a would-be spirituality. It seems most
plausible to understand Heidegger’s Nazi episode
as the kind of spiritual metapathology—here of an
inflation and grandiosity—that Maslow (1962) and
Jung (1928/1960) have seen as a vulnerability of
modern attempts at a new secular or this-worldly
mysticism. (For a more extended treatment of these
issues in major spiritual figures, including both
Heidegger and Jung, see Hunt, 2003.)
By 1928 Heidegger was left with the
sudden international fame of Being and Time,
the recent deaths of both parents, and the end
of his now notorious affair with his young Jewish
student Hannah Arendt, who had also been his
creative muse prior to its writing.7 He comes to
see a “nothing” or absence at the core of Being
(Heidegger, 1930/1995). Here he writes expressively
of the contemporary forgetfulness of Being as a
form of “boredom,” in the sense of a “queer kind
of indifference,” “being left empty,” and “futility”—
very much evoking the schizoid diminution of “vital
presence” that Wilhelm Reich (1949/1961) and
more recently the phenomenological psychiatrist
Louis Sass (1992) have seen as the reflection of a
widespread loss of meaning in modern culture. His
sudden enthusiasm as the first Nazi Rector of a major
university and extolling of Promethean Will as the
“first philosophy” in his National Socialist university
speeches (Neske & Kettering, 1990), meanwhile
shaving his moustache to look more like Hitler,
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would seem to justify his then friend the existential
philosopher Karl Jaspers’ conclusion that he was
both fatally “naïve” and “delusional,” and that he
hoped to be a sort of “spiritual Fuhrer” or Platonic
philosopher-king for the movement (Grunenberg,
2017; Ott, 1993).
This author will seek to show below that
the larger significance of this period of grandiose
intoxification became his path out of it—and its
more contemporary implications. In his initial
lectures and notebooks after his resignation he
mocked the “mass rallies,” “dismal biologism of
race,” “vulgar ethical materialism” of Nazi ideology,
and the “brainless” appeal of Hitler’s Mein Kampf
(Heidegger, 1935/1961, pp. 31, 39; 1938/2016,
pp. 99, 104, 105). While acknowledging his
earlier hopes for a “spiritual” National Socialism,
he came to see the movement not as some
renewal of civilization, but as the culmination of
a false Western metaphysics of “will to power”—
the political expression of a commodification
of nature and people that will destroy the
planet. The lectures, unpublished books, and
notebooks that follow from 1935 through 1947
fill out his approach to a post-nationalistic, postracial “homeland” through the nature poetry of
Hölderlin, along with his more abstract planetary
intuitions of Other Beginning and last god.
With a few exceptions, these writings—the
main focus of this present work—came to a stop with
the shock of Heidegger’s post-war de-nazification
hearings. He had, in his naivité, assumed that
his resignation and lecture critiques would have
somehow outweighed the notoriety of Germany’s
most famous academic’s public endorsement
of Hitler. Banned from teaching, and suffering a
series of recurrent depressions, he went through a
“breakdown” and brief hospitalization. Encouraged
by Jaspers and some former students to publicly
admit guilt and moral responsibility, he could only
confess a private shame—which probably best
explains his otherwise “notorious” postwar silence
on the Holocaust.
The vulnerability to intense shame, for
the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut (1984), is part of a
narcissistic weakness in sense of self that is consistent
with accounts of his cold, austere maternal upbringing
Hunt

and the desperate compensatory grandiosity of his
Rectorship speeches. Where the guilt of a more
cohesive self can be publicly confessed and so seek
reparation, shame can only continue to hide, deny,
and seek to justify—as he himself did. His wartime
writings on a planetary spiritual renewal are largely
replaced by more specific work on technology
and the nature of thinking. He becomes bitter and
more overtly pessimistic—saying in a late interview:
“Only a god can save us now” (Neske & Kettering,
1990, p. 57)—and so becoming his own example of
Weber (1922/1963) on the “broken quality” of the
heightened sensitivity of a this-worldly mysticism.
Brilliancy, Aloneness, Eros:
A Further Cost of Genius
The intensity and felt brilliancy of mystical
experience, and indeed the ecstasy in all intense
creative experience, require a certain capacity
for aloneness and solitude that can also become
intensely painful (Almaas, 2006; Storr, 1989).
D. W. Winnicott (1958) understood the capacity to be
alone as requiring a sense of selfhood rooted in the
early maternal holding relationship, which becomes
internalized as the dialogic matrix for later creative
consciousness. When not securely established—
which it clearly was not in the early upbringing
of Heidegger—the aloneness intrinsic to ecstatic
brilliancy can intensify what Winnicott’s mentor
Melanie Klein (1963) termed a schizoid loneliness—
as a felt futility, emptiness, and intolerable sense
of absence. The spiritual metapathology that can
then arise is a desperately felt necessity for the
externalized erotic muse relationships that became
so central in the later life of Heidegger—as also in
the personal lives of both Jung and Wilhelm Reich
(Bair, 2003; Sharaf, 1983).
In letters to his wife, Elfride, written over the
many years of his intense isolation during writing
retreats, Heidegger describes something of the
creative ecstasy he then feels:
[It is] like a revelation, an elemental force…
something unutterable…[in which] I am wholly
and absolutely present…all alien distractions
disappeared…what does “moment” mean
here…it is an inappropriate designation….
(Heidegger, G., 2008, pp. 8, 66)
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Yet these periods of isolation occasion an aloneness
that would later lead him to a series of passionate
affairs:
This dreadful feeling of isolation….An intense
loneliness from the realization that no one can
help…as one tries to find one’s way back….
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 84)
Indeed, his friend the existential psychiatrist Medard
Boss (1988, p. 8) describes Heidegger’s outward
appearance of deep depression during his periods
of creative thinking—“as if wounded in some
indescribable way.”
Writing to his wife in some mixture of
apology and would-be justification for the affairs
that soon often preceded or followed his creative
retreats, he says:
If my existence is without passion my voice falls
silent and the source does not spring forth….
[The god Eros] moves me…when something
long intuited is to be led across into the realm
of the sayable and when what has been said
must after all be left in solitude. (Heidegger, G.,
2008, pp. 254, 213)
He goes on to blame:
The manner of my early upbringing, inability
in…the ability to trust, and then again
inconsiderateness in the abuse of trust…
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 213).
The latter alludes to her own confession at the
time of the birth of their second child, who had
been conceived, during one of Heidegger’s writing
retreats, in the arms of her childhood friend—which
Heidegger accepted and forgave.8
These letters do make for a sad and painful
reading. Perhaps their larger significance rests in
their demonstration, as also in the lives of both Jung
and Reich, that a re-newed this-worldly spirituality in
a contemporary sensate-materialist era would entail
the continuity of soul and body explicitly rejected in
more traditional “other worldly” religiosity. A radical
openness to experience in-the-world will tend to
revive a more neo-shamanic continuity between
sexuality and mystical states (Tedlock, 2005; Hunt,
2018b), with the actual phenomenology of ecstasy
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in both more alike than different in any essence
(Laski, 1961; Wade, 2013).
A Sad Banality of Genius
That Heidegger was not personally antisemitic seems clear enough, despite his participation
in the very political machinations of the Rectorship
(Ott, 1993). After all, his mentor was Edmund
Husserl, the Jewish originator of phenomenology, in
itself a rare choice for a conservatively raised rural
Catholic, and almost all of his most famous students
were Jewish, later recalling the sharp contrast
between his personal warmth and his fervently Nazi
wife’s cold rejection (Neske & Kettering, 1990).
So the more recent publication of his notebooks
from the 1930s caused a deep shock through the
community of Heidegger scholars (Farin & Malpas,
2016; Trawny, 2015). Scattered throughout are the
most stereotypical expressions of the cultural antisemitism all too typical of popular opinion in Europe
of the day, but hardly what anyone had expected
of one of the greatest independent spiritual thinkers
of the times—and one whose writings had actually
been denigrated by the Nazi Education Ministry
as “Talmudic” (Falias, 1989). So there is the sad
irony of these occasional passages on Jewish
“cosmopolitanism,” “homelessness,” “calculative
manipulation,” “empty rationality,” and a “dangerous
international fraternity of Jews” (Heidegger,
1939/2017, p. 153; 1941/2017, pp. 224–225). Was it
embittered defiance that left him comfortable with
their posthumous publication, and this after the very
public reconciliation with Hannah Arendt? It is true,
with Harries (2016), that removing all references to
Jewish “homelessness” and “calculativeness” leaves
his critique of modernity entirely intact, and which
he never blamed on Judaism anyway. Yet what is
one to make of the contemporaneous contrast of
his praise in a letter to his wife of Martin Buber
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 225) and then, after finally
admitted back to university teaching, standing at the
lectern and commenting that there were too many
Jews on the faculty, while silently counting them off
on his fingers (Farin, 2016, p. 207)?
This is all entirely so stereotypically ordinary,
stupid, and ignorant that it should not be seen as
some Jamesian theopathy or Maslow metapathology
of distorted spiritual realization. At most it reminds

12

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

of Jung (1921/1971) on extreme onesidedness in
development—say of a highly introverted intuitive
thinking—as inevitably opposed by what he aptly
termed its undeveloped, and so, inferior function—
here an undeveloped feeling taking the form of an
abject moral obtuseness. Heidegger becomes yet
another example of the larger issue in present times
of how, or not, to separate a deeply flawed personal
character from the actual genius of creative work.
Heidegger’s Way Forward:
Toward Other Beginning
or Heidegger the first step past a globalizing,
technologically driven commodification of earth
and world had to be its full acknowledgement—in
all its new uncanniness.
A Planetary Dilemma of Machination
and Inner Homelessness
Heidegger’s initial path into this understanding of global crisis comes from his series of
lecture courses on Nietzsche between 1936 and
1944 (Nietzsche, Vols. 1–4). Rejecting any approach
that would see Nietzsche as offering his own
futural understanding of a this-worldly spirituality
(as in Noll, 1994; Hunt, 2003), Heidegger came
to understand his own enthrallment with National
Socialism as “a kind of hubris” (Olafson, 2000,
p. 273) infected by a Nietzschean “will to power”
that was the antithesis of the “releasement” into
Being he now sought. Heidegger saw this “will to
power” as the underlying metaphysic of modern
Western culture—a narrowing, anthropomorphizing
projection of an all-too-human domination onto
the primary thatness of Being. Nietzsche’s wouldbe “overman” of the future, who would will the
affirmation of this ultimately meaningless “eternal
recurrence of the same” in a “yea-saying” of
Dionysian ecstasy, becomes for Heidegger a kind
of distorted Promethean Homo-Deus—the very
opposite of a more fundamental humility he finally
came to feel in the face of Being as such.
Heidegger (1954/1977, 1949/2012) understands the inner essence of this will-to-power and
its universal commodification in terms of Gestell—
variously translated as “Enframing” or “Positionality.”
Gestell in the German means a frame, stand, or rack
which positions its instruments or tools in advance
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for their use. For Heidegger this is the metaphor
for a universal metaphysic in which all of Being is
“calculable in advance” as measurable commodity
or “standing reserve” (Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 21).
Enframing is still Being—what else could it be?—
but as a metaphysics of planetary domination it
has become for Heidegger “something demonic”
(Heidegger, 1949/2012, p. 58)—more recently best
captured in the notion of the Anthropocene as a
new human-made geologic age.
Implicit within Enframing as the inner structure
of modernity—and beneath its enforced forgetfulness
of any larger context of Being-as-such—is a new
form of the uncanny—Otto’s most preliminary of the
broader dimensions of the numinous. While its sense
of “strangeness,” “unreality” and “unsettlement”
will be most commonly denied and suppressed, its
fuller acknowledgement becomes the only opening
to any futural Other Beginning. For Heidegger this
new uncanny reflects a specific shift in the inherent
“strife” of earth and world—in terms of the above
discussion, as an unprecedentedly unbalanced
collision/mergence between person and thing—
that core of the uncanny for Freud. For Heidegger
a “thing” technology that ostensibly mirrors and
extends human purpose comes increasingly to
circumscribe and dominate that purpose—most
clearly reflected now in artificial intelligence,
automated expert systems, and an eventual genetic
engineering.
Here then is Heidegger in 1939:
The “miracles” of technology…enchant the
human being, such that he arrives at the opinion
that he himself dominates the miracle, whereas
he has become merely the most submissive cog
in a machine.(Heidegger, 1939/2017, p. 306)
This will elicit the felt “unsettlement” and
“strangeness” Heidegger finds at the heart of
a perpetual technological innovation—its new
uncanny.9
The German for “uncanny” is unheimlich—
literally unfamiliar, strange…Un-homelike. This
usage becomes the bridge for the later Heidegger to
his view of a globalizing inner “homelessness”—the
felt loss of an “at homeness” and founded sense of
“dwelling.”
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The closure of the holy…lets all beings stand
in the unfamiliar….The unfamiliarity of beings
as such brings to light the homelessness of
historical man within beings as a whole….The
partly conceded, partly denied homelessness
of man with regard to his essence is replaced
by the organized global conquest of the earth,
and the thrust into outer space. (Heidegger,
1946/1982, p. 248)
This theme is most fully developed in his 1947 Letter
on Humanism, where “homelessness becomes a
world destiny” (Heidegger, 1947/1962, p. 287).
Hannah Arendt (1978) in her later extension
of Heidegger’s critique of “will to power” points
out that the orientation toward perpetual novelty—
held well short of the more intrinsic wonder of
the numinous—must in itself be opposed—if only
implicitly—to all tradition. This is a view shared as
well with Simone Weil in her last book The Need
for Roots (1949/2002). One could add that this
globalizing will to novelty has been doing more
slowly to Western civilization what it inflicted more
rapidly on colonized indigenous peoples—with
the disruptions of their family structures, enforced
re-settlements, and loss of culture and traditional
spirituality. The result was the despair, suicide, and
resort to numbing drug use and intoxication now
also rampant throughout the capitalized world
economy. One is left to wonder whether Heidegger’s
essentialized inner “homelessness” of modernity
may be destined for its own literalization in the
globalized impact of a human-driven ecological
crisis, with its widely forecast displacements and
actual homelessness.
It also seems relevant to note that Heidegger
would have seen the present era of transpersonal and
consciousness studies as risking its own deflection
into a merely compensatory “subjectivism” and
unintended commodification of experience. He
distinguishes between experience as Erlebnis or
lived experience—as also in current “altered” or
“higher” states of consciousness—and Erfahrung—
experience in the sense of a cohesive and sustained
meaning. The dualism of subject and object he sees
underlying Western civilization, while manifesting
outwardly in technological enthrallment, will have
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

13

its corresponding and compensatory over-valuation
of “lived experience” for its own sake.
Thus he warns against “psychic adventuring”
or “intoxification” with the “alien,” “exotic,” and
merely “unusual” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 109;
1942/2018, p. 152):
The loss of the gods is so far from excluding
religiosity that rather only through that loss is the
relation to the gods changed into mere “religious
experience”….The resultant void is compensated
for by means of…psychological investigation of
myth. (Heidegger, 1954/1977, p. 117)
So much here for James and Jung—and doubtless
unfairly to those pioneers of a present transpersonal
era. Heidegger will similarly reject what he sees as an
“instrumental” attitude to spirituality as “intelligence”
(as in Hunt, 2016), in which the holy “falls to the
level of a tool in the service of others,” a “utilitarian
intelligence” (Heidegger, 1935/1961, pp. 38, 40).
From Heidegger’s perspective then, the current
fascination with “peak” and “flow” experiences
in extreme sports, mindfulness meditation in the
service of mental health and “well being,” and
LSD micro-dosing for creative business innovation,
as in Kotler and Wheal’s aptly titled Stealing Fire
(2017), would become the most extreme examples
of a commodification of consciousness that while
seeking to compensate the new “strangeness”
actually blocks its deepening into the Erfahrung of
Other Beginning.
Here the “creative minority” Toynbee foresaw as someday moving toward a global spiritual
renewal becomes just another “power elite.”
Hölderlin and Re-sacralizing the World:
A Regional Neo-Shamanism
Heidegger’s first positive step toward a
re-sacralizing Other Beginning, beginning from
the mid 1930s, was his developing interpretation
of the nature poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin. He
sees in Hölderlin the re-creation of an originary
homeland for “Germania” by linking the expressive
physiognomies of its rivers and forests with a Greek
mythology of Olympian sky gods and chthonian
maternal deities of ground and fate. For Hölderlin the
animation of earth, sky, towns, and rivers through a
Greek polytheism creates a kind of sacred regional
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geography. Hölderlin’s own by-passing of the
Germanic Wotan and the Norse gods so central to
a National Socialist romanticism allows Heidegger
an understanding of “homeland” that undercuts
the quasi-religious notions of race, ethnicity, and
nationhood that he had come to criticize.10 There is
a comparison here to Jung who in these same years
was moving past his own initial fascination with
a National Socialist nativism, so resonant with his
earlier formulations of a separate Aryan, Chinese,
and Jewish “racial unconscious,” to the more
abstract metaphoricities of mandalas, alchemy, and
a “land mysticism” of region and nature (see Hunt,
2003).
Heidegger now clearly rejects the mass
movement of National Socialism as any kind of “new
beginning” in the face of a larger “loss of the holy”:
The people of the country may not attempt to
make themselves a god by cunning and thus
put aside by force the supposed lack…of holy
names. (Heidegger, 1943/1949, p. 265)
“The fatherland”…for the poet…does not
mean some dubious greatness of an even more
dubious patriotism full of noise. He means
the “land of the fathers”…This people of this
earth….” (Heidegger, 1935/2014, p. 108)
Instead Heidegger utilizes Hölderlin’s poetry of
the rushing Rhine, with its “fury of the demi-god,”
and the more gentle flow of the Ister (the Roman
name for the Danube) to suggest the boundaries of
an original “strife”—defining a “homeland” linking
“heavenly fire” with a slower “planning” or “ability
to grasp”:
[The Rhine]…is to plunge downward and
from out of the force of such a plunge to be
able at once to hasten away…The Ister by
contrast appears…a hesitant whiling…almost
backward flow…patiently alongside its [source].
(Heidegger, 1942/1996, p. 162)
In these rivers:
Land and earth are given limits of shape, and
the homeland comes into being for…truth for
the people. (Heidegger, 1935/2014, p. 204)
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Heidegger has in mind here something
post-national and specifically regional. It can also
thereby become a model for all other regions
and peoples—much as Henry David Thoreau
(1854/1982) had already attempted for the woods
of New England. By broader implication, the
Thoreau (or Hölderlin) of the Arizona desert,
New York Finger Lakes, Midwest plains, and
Northern California and Oregon coast will intuit
very different “root metaphors” of these nonverbal
levels of meaning. They are also the physiognomic
patterns of Jung’s archetypes and the non
reductive, non perjorative equivalents of his “racial
unconscious”—the potential re-emergence of a
regional neo-shamanism of the land as emblem of
the sacred.
Heidegger’s understanding of “the poet”—
who in “naming the holy” becomes a “demi-god”
who loses himself in “bliss”—is clearly close to
Weber’s this worldly charismatic mystic. In an
age of radical secularization Heidegger’s poet
is engaged in a “holy mourning” (Heidegger,
1935/2014, p. 204; 1942/1996, p. 163). The poet is
to “hold the ground” of “the no-more of the gods
that have fled and of the not-yet of the god that
is coming” (Heidegger, 1936/1949, pp. 289–290).
Hölderlin, who suffered recurring schizophrenic
episodes, reflecting also the deeply conflicted
nature of a transitional this-worldly spirituality, is
thus described by Heidegger as “struck down…and
driven into the dark…by the excessive brightness”
(Heidegger, 1936/1949, p. 285).
This “naming of the holy” by HeideggerHölderlin is based on the metaphoric embodiment
and mirroring in feeling of the expressive
dimensions of physical nature—of the light and
darkness, dynamic flows, heights and depths—
evoking deeper non verbal emblems of Dasein.
Rather than being some logical “domain violation”
of “primitive thought” (Boyer & Ramble, 2001),
the animation of nature in classical mythologies
reflects the exteriorization of physical metaphors
also implicit in the etymologies of words for feeling
in all languages (Arnheim, 1969; Kugler, 1982) and
spontaneous phrases describing felt emotion (Asch,
1961; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In Heidegger’s
version of this inherent metaphoricity:
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We are tempted to say the sun and wind manifest
themselves as “natural phenomena” and then
“in addition” signify something further; they are
“symbols” for us….As if it were not the reverse,
that…the “things themselves” are already each
time poetized before they become so called
“symbols.” (Heidegger, 1942/2018, pp. 34–35)
The poet/mystic/shaman, in becoming the symbol,
is being that specific dimension of the numinous.
Marghanita Laski (1961) similarly describes
the mediation of mystical experience by the “quasi
physical sensations” conveyed by words for heights
(soaring), luminosity (flashing, brilliancy), darkness
(abyss, shining blackness), expansion (bursting),
and words describing liquidity and flow (dissolving,
melting, streaming). A. H. Almaas (1986) has
specified these same cross-modal or synesthetic
qualities in terms of the Indian chakras or Sufi lataif of
the red of essential strength, the yellow of joy-bliss,
the black of power as peace, the shining white of will
as surrender/allowance, the golden melting of love,
and the green of compassion. In the vision trance
of shamanism (Eliade, 1964; Walsh, 2007) these
chakra/lataif qualities are encountered outwardly as
the expressive dimensions of nature—as in the play
of light through streaming clouds mediating joy and
serenity in Heidegger’s explication of the verses of
Hölderlin:
The cloud…lingers above against “the silver
heights”….the clear brightness…serenifies this
lingering. What it writes, the “Joyous,” is the
Serene….That which causes joy shines forth
towards the homecoming poet….This pure
lighting…the streaming lighting itself…we
call the Serene. The Serene is fundamentally
healing. It is the holy. (Heidegger, 1943/1949,
pp. 247–248, 251)
As for Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Every natural fact is
a symbol of some spiritual fact” (1836/1963, p. 12).
In his post-war essays, “The thing” (1950),
and “Building, dwelling, thinking” (1951), Heidegger
extends this understanding of Hölderlin’s sacred
geography into a more general neo-shamanic
understanding of an originary being-in-the-world
as the crossing of two foundational dimensions
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in the “foursome” of earth-sky and mortals-gods.
This would be the metaphorically expressed
deep structure of Dasein, in contrast to the more
conceptual analysis of Being and Time, and as
such, one can add, would be filled in differently
for each culture and its metaphorized region. Here
the pre-Socratic physis, or nature, is unfolded into
the dimension of earth—as what “upholds” and
supports in the guardianship of “dwelling”—and sky,
as the horizonal openness of the meaning of sunrise
and sunset so easily lost in any more astronomical
“explanation.” Meanwhile, the pre-Socratic logos—
as the original openness of thought—unfolds into
the dimension of mortals—understood in terms of
Dasein’s being-toward-death rather than Aristotle’s
animal rationale—and gods, as the mythic divinities
that “animate” earth and sky. Mortals, open to the
unknown ahead, are thereby attuned to the Beingas-such whose reflection the gods must have if
they are to exist for a community as “real.” Thereby
the foursome is held open as the “inbetween” for
a “roundance” of cross mirrored and sustaining
meaning specific to each culture.
Heidegger’s “foursome” can be seen as an
independent essentializing of the anthropologist
Claude Levi-Strauss (1966) on the elaborate multidimensional classificatory lattices in the mythological
systems of tribal peoples, cross referencing the
specificities of local geography, seasons, the varieties
of plant and animal life, social roles and clan
structure, all linked to mythic stories of gods, spirits,
and ancestors. The classical sociologists Durkheim
and Mauss (1903/1963) had earlier located these
dimensions as still implicit within the religious
schematizations of world civilizations—seeing the
Chinese I-Ching, with its juxtaposition of Taoist/
Confucian meanings with the physiognomies of
nature, colors, geographical directions, and family
roles, as one such more explicit survival (see also
Hunt, 2011). These lattices of meaning—whether
explicit or implicit—constitute the inner matrix
of what Emile Durkheim (1912/1961) would call
the “collective representations” of a communal or
shared consciousness. This notion of consciousness
as intrinsically “collective” is in marked contrast to
the Western tradition of consciousness as individual,
separate, and ultimately “private”—which for
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Heidegger is part of the alienation and “unsettlement”
of modernity. The question for Heidegger, as for Jung,
becomes the extent to which an originary sense of
“at homeness” and “dwelling” might be recoverable
through this kind of re-mythologized thinking.
What Heidegger has done with his
abstract foursome is to offer a new version of his
deep structure of Dasein to counter the present
globalization of a calculative mentality that can only
understand humanity “biologistically”—ultimately
as Nietzsche’s “super-animal.” Meanwhile this
foursome would have to be specified differently for
the distinct regional identities of different cultures and
peoples. This offers a more grounded replacement
for the current populist and ethnic-national reactions
against the economic globalization that opposes
these regionalisms—which began of course in the
1930s with the Aryan would-be biologism Heidegger
came to oppose. His foursome thus represents both
a common humanity and a regionally specified
“homeland.”11
Heidegger would almost certainly agree that
the present planetary crisis of climate change and
ecological sustainability cannot be fully addressed
by pitting one calculative instrumentalism—however
rational human survival is as an issue—against
another. There is, indeed, some emerging consensus
that a more “non rational” re-sanctification of planet
and humanity will be needed—despite the view of
the scientific Enlightenment that all “superstition”
had been left behind (Taylor, 1989). For Hawken
(2007), in his Blessed Unrest, on the current
gathering together of the initially separated issues of
ecological survival, world-wide social justice, and
the rights and traditions of indigenous peoples:
We cannot save our planet unless human
kind undergoes a widespread and religious
awakening….Fixes won’t fix unless we fix our
souls as well. (p. 184)
This sounds very like Heidegger’s sacralised
“guardianship” and neo-shamanic “sheparding.”
Other Beginning, Freedom, and Last God
n these same years, from the late 1930s, Heidegger
also began to address a more abstract, truly global,
level of a futural spiritual renewal.

I

Hunt

Inceptualities of Being:
First and Other
Heidegger pictured a globalizing “loss of the
holy” as “the very twilight of the most monstrous
transformation our planet has undergone” and “the
dawn of an altogether different age” (Heidegger,
1946/1975, p. 17). In answer, he sought a deeper
understanding of the origins of Western thought in
the Greek pre-Socratics in order to regain from that
originating paradigm some intuition of a still latent
Other Beginning to come. For Heidegger the preSocratic First Beginning rested on Physis or Nature as
organic emergence, an ever-arising unconcealment,
in which Being surges forth as ecstatic “fire of the
world” (Heidegger, 1943/1975, p. 112). By contrast
he intuits an Other Beginning—implicative and as
the yet unspecified within the first—in terms of the
imagery of a “Clearing” (Lichtung)—with its potential
for an emergent sense of openness, releasement,
and freedom (Heidegger, 1938/2012). This openness
or Clearing is also the basis for a futural Da-sein or
sense of human identity—with humanity as the “inbetween” that holds open the Foursome.
It may follow from Heidegger’s origins
within Husserlian phenomenology that he implicitly
models the relation of First and Other Beginning—as
distinct historical ages of spiritual understanding—
on the inner unfoldment of thought itself. For Eugene
Gendlin (1962), himself strongly influenced by
Heidegger, the “felt meaning” in all thinking begins
from an open unspecifiable “sense,” which can then
unfold into more specific and sayable meanings.
It is only then that one may or may not sense
one’s understanding as cohering into a now fully
specified whole. The initially inchoate beginning of
any felt meaning is only fully understandable in its
completion—as either fulfilled or needing instead a
renewed beginning.
Heidegger seems to be applying something
like this model to the stages of a world spirituality.
So it is only within the now better understood
implicit ground of the pre-Socratics—illuminated
for Heidegger through its final miscarriage into
a globalizing mentality of calculation—that an
Other Beginning for the sense of the holy might be
intuited. That still deeper beginning is latent within
the first—whose full understanding “does not reside
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Numinous Experience

back in a past but lies in advance of what is to
come,” (Heidegger, 1942/1992, p. 1). Thus there is
an intrinsic inner relation between:
The First Beginning, which is still to be won
back, and the Other Beginning which is still to
be unfolded. (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 47)
As audacious as this may seem, if one posits
that the numinous has a “deep structure” similar to
that of language, and if Heidegger, Toynbee, and
Jung are correct that something called “spirituality”
is as intrinsic to human creativity as language itself,
then just as the Axial civilizations schematized
an overlapping first beginning out of that deep
structure, then perhaps Heidegger can intuit an
Other Beginning that awaits its own drawing forth
as the creative response to an emerging sensate–
material global world order.
Heidegger pictures the relation between
his First and Other Beginning in terms of a “guiding
notion” of light and luminosity—which has always
been central to the cross cultural metaphoricity of
the numinous (see Hunt, 1995). Thus he likens the
arising surgence of pre-Socratic Being, welling forth
as wonder and awe, to a flash of lightning in the night,
with the sudden intensity of its brightness gathering
and fixing everything that suddenly arises out of
the surrounding darkness (Heidegger, 1944/1975,
p. 72), while the lightning itself has already
withdrawn “behind” its circle of illumination:
The unconcealment of beings, the brightness
granted them, obscures the light of Being. As
it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws.
(Heidegger, 1946/1975, p. 26)
For Heidegger it is this blinding but fixated
unconcealment that also creates the potential for
a characteristic and intrinsic Western “errancy.”
This becomes a narrowed conviction and
“certainty” finally emerging as such in the scientific
“objectivity” of an Enlightment and culminating
in the unquestioned necessity of a perpetual
technologized novelty. Meanwhile another part of
the “strangeness” of modernity lies in its present
scientific and conceptual uncertainly and relativity,
rendering that novelty unstoppable, regardless of its
consequences.
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The Clearing of Heidegger’s Other Beginning,
implicit in that “lighting” of the First, is based on
the German sense of Lichtung as the opening out
of a woodland glade or forest clearing (Heidegger,
1938/2012; 1942/2013). Later he will suggest it also
evokes the contemporary globalizing “clearing
away” and “freedom from” all tradition (Heidegger
& Fink, 1967/1979). Thus the Clearing of Being
comes to include both the sense of an “inceptual”
subtle glow—a “simple brightness” of unconcealing
openness seen through the trees—and a lack of any
ground (Abgrund or Abyss), an absence of sensed
foundation. This is the incipient contemporary
nihilism out of which Other Beginning must unfold.
The Clearing is:
The dim glow of the attuning attunement out of
the ab-grund (removal of all ground) of Being.
(Heidegger, 1939/2006, p. 90)
Here Heidegger’s Other Beginning—in the sheer
subtlety of its pre-dawn glow—becomes a collective
version of the “negative theologies” of an Eckhart
or Ibn Arabi—in which Being—as the unique and
incomparable—can only be described in terms of
absence and what it is not.12 The fullest sensing of
the numinous becomes the completely ineffable
and wholly other. This is the thin line between a
“clearing away” and a “clearing for” that Heidegger
sees as the dilemma of a future humanity.
The Event of Being:
A Mutual Appropriation of Being and Da-sein
The very possibility of multiple Beginnings
means that Being itself is Event. It is historical,
with Da-sein understood as its opening—readying
now to re-emerge as Clearing. With Toynbee and
Sorokin, human history can be understood in terms
of epochs of spiritual awakening and forgetfulness.
Heidegger is positing an essence or deep
structure of Da-sein that would be this continual
potentiality.
Being as Event is based on Heidegger’s
amplification of the ordinary German Ereignis—
for happening, occurence, event, along with the
closely related Aneignung—as an acquiring or
taking, usually translated as Appropriation—
or in Heidegger’s broader usage “Event of
Appropriation,” and more narrowly by some as
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“Enownment” (Emad & Maly, 1999). The eigen
root of both words means “one’s own,” while
eignen means “belonging to.” Epochs of Being are
thus unique “sendings” in which Being “enowns”
Dasein and vice versa.
In Heidegger’s language of the late 1930s,
Being, as Event of Appropriation, appropriates Dasein as the expanse for its successive “lightings,”
and Da-sein appropriates Being as its felt source,
meaning, and ground—however schematized.
The Da becomes the “in-between” of this mutual
appropriation. The Appropriation of Dasein by
Being is at the same time a “giving” or “sending”
of the holy—with its quality of “it has you” or
dependency, and a simultaneous holding itself
back in withdrawal—as implicate within Otto and
James on the ultimate ineffability of the numinous.
Heidegger was especially intrigued with the root
meaning of the German es gibt or “it is”—literally
as “it gives” or “it lets.” For Heidegger this implies
a tacit grace within all ordinary events—one held
back but always implied within ordinary usage
(Heidegger, 1938/2012; 1962/1972).
It was this language of Event and
Appropriation that Heidegger needed for his
futural Other Beginning. Therein the “it” of “it
gives” has undergone a specific transformation:
The “clearing away” of tradition as an uncanny
“unsettlement” leaves the “clearing for” empty—
the “it” of “it gives” an ostensible “nothing.” Indeed
he occasionally later writes Being as Being, akin to
the Buddhist void in its simultaneous emptiness
and incipient fullness (Heidegger, 1956/1958).
Thus modernity loses both the “giving” and the
“withheld” sense of source in a “de-divinization”
(Heidegger, 1939/2017, p. 20), a kind of
“unconcealment of the concealment” (Heidegger,
1938/2012, p. 277). This is experienced as a
“refusal” of Being—its abandonment of the
appropriation of Dasein sensed as a pointlessness
in existence. Any collective re-newal could only
come through the full experiencing of this sense
of refusal/abandonment (Heidegger, 1940/2015)—
which in that very “personification,” one can
add, would begin its own re-linkage to a socialpersonal “understanding” as the larger context for
the present ubiquity of calculative “explanation.”
Hunt

Heidegger’s understanding of this loss of
sensed foundation or “absence of ground” (Abgrund) has been variously translated as “abyss”
(Heidegger, 1940/2015) or “refusal of ground”
(Heidegger, 1938/2012), its ordinary German
equivalents including chasm, fissure, abyss, or gap.
The Other Beginning would require a collective
Da-sein to come back to itself in what Heidegger
variously terms a “twisting away” or “turning back”
from its enthrallment with a perpetual novelty of
beings, back toward the openness of the Clearing.13
There needs to be the willingness to “wait” in that
“stillness”—held open for the possibility of a predawn Inceptuality (Anfanglichkeit)—as the inner
form of “beginning:”
Only in the Other Beginning is the Inceptuality
experienced and the Clearing of the beginning
itself bestowed….The beginning brings itself
to the Clearing in something illumined by the
Inceptuality (Heidegger, 1942/2013, pp. 166–167)
This impalpable, purely incipient sense
of Inceptuality creates a thin line between
Heidegger’s naturalized phenomenology of Being
and a collective version of a more traditional
“dark night of the soul”—or better perhaps “long
grey night of the soul.” The felt absence of sensed
ground occludes the incipience of any “dawning”
not yet understood as such. For Heidegger it is only
the full feeling of that emptiness—a “meditative”
attention to the open clearing ahead—that can
open to grace—much as for Weil (1947/2002) and
Almaas (1988) essential realizations must emerge
out of their fully felt “holes” of suffering and
lack.
A Dependence of Being on Da-sein:
The Human Capability for God
For Heidegger Being “needs” humanity
to hold open the Clearing in order to allow its
fullness to appear as such. Without that opening
“for,” humanity is “denied its capacity for God”
(Heidegger, 1939/2006, p. 48).
Beyng needs humans in order to occur
essentially, and humans belong to Beyng so that
they might fulfill their ultimate destiny as Dasein….Beyng needs Da-sein and does not…
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occur without this appropriation (Heidegger,
1938/2012, p. 198, 200)
An Other Beginning cannot be without the
“stillness,” “waiting,” and “solitude” of the Clearing.
Its meditative attunement must be kept free of the
endless instrumentalities of modern culture, to
allow an opening for the inceptual “uniqueness,”
“singularity,” “sovereignty,” and “solitude” of a Being
which is thereby incomparable—not knowing an
“other” like itself (Heidegger, 1938/2012, pp. 180,
198; 1939/2006, p. 292; 1939/2017, p. 47.)
Here Heidegger not only evokes the earlier
influence of Meister Eckhart’s (1941) dependency
of an impalpable Godhead on the individual soul,
but there is an even more striking and ostensibly
independent resonance with the Medieval Sufi
mystic Ibn Arabi (Chittick, 1989). For Ibn Arabi
the Absolute—sometimes referred to as Beingas-such—is similarly unique, an unrepresentable
singularity, and so “incomparable.” It is dependent
for its self-awareness on the meditation of the
Sage, who gathers and reflects back to the One
the myriad “comparables” of its creation, and in
that sense both creates and reveals its otherwise
withheld Reality. Ibn Arabi refers to this reflectingback-that-brings-forward as the Sage becoming
“capable of God” and so “alone with the Alone”
(Chittick, 1989; Corbin, 1998). As with Heidegger,
an attuned humanity brings Being forward through
our capacity for the numinous. God’s need of us
in order to Be is a notion also central to Gurdjieff
(1975) and Jung (1961)—and arguably one of the
paradoxes of a fully this-worldly spirituality.
As with the ambiguity of Heidegger’s
versions of negative theology and “dark night,”
there is a similar thin line—or indeed reversing
gestalt figure—between Heidegger’s view of Being
as dependent on the opening of Da-sein—our
“capability for God”—and a more “scientific” view
of spirituality as a projective human intelligence—
perhaps indeed instrumentally useful for “mental
health” and “life meaning”—but based like all
intelligences on physio-chemical modules of the
central nervous system as their “causation.”14 As
also for Jung (1961), a futural New Age spirituality
for a globalized sensate economy would need to
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reconcile this more “naturalized” understanding of
the numinous.
Meanwhile for Heidegger the phenomenological revolution that formed his thought is based
on the primacy of human experience as such—on
the “it has you” of James on consciousness. That
phenomenological “giveness” becomes the emergent
and non reducible context of understanding for
the thereby subordinated cognitive functions and
specific intelligences that it reveals as its more
specific dimensions. This “lighting” of immediate
experience as primary was traditionally held in
place by God.
The Last God
Heidegger’s Other Beginning for a planetary
spirituality—based on a “meditative thinking”
(Heidegger, 1959/1966)—would entail its own more
specific religiosity. This might or might not arise out
of what he calls “waiting” for the “last god.”
For Heidegger the Clearing of and for Being
was held open and in place in classical cultures
by the foursome of mortals and divinities, earth
and sky. It would be this “in-between” of Dasein
that allowed the “light” of Being for those gods—
conferring their felt Reality—which in turn allowed
them to animate earth and sky. So any possibility
of a futural “last god” will require the sense of renewed Being opening up from a “leap of the human
being into Da-sein” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 330).
Within that “lighting” may or may not appear the
unfolded schematization of a new planetary religion
presently unimaginable.
There has been considerable debate over
the interpretation of “last” in Heidegger’s “last god”
(Law, 2000). The German letzt variously means last
and final, latest, and ultimate or extreme. It seems
clear that Heidegger’s meaning was not “last” in the
sense of “final”:
The last god is not the end, but is instead the Other
Beginning of the immeasurable possibilities of
our history. (Heidegger, 1938/2016, p. 228)
In addition to thereby including “last” in the sense
of next or latest, Heidegger also intends, at least by
contrast with the previous world religions, a meaning
of “ultimate,” in the sense of his deeper beginning
only coming later. Here again he implies a sort of
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“deep structure” of the numinous, with its more
planetary wide expressions as potentially more
“form near.” In Otto’s terms, the schematization of
the numinous Heidegger would have in mind would
be responsive to a global run-away technology, total
planetary commodification, and crisis of human
“stewardship”—conditions of life broader than
those inspiring the previous world religions.
A long preparation is required for the great
moment of the passing by of the Last God. Peoples
and states are too small for the preparation of
that moment. (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 328)
The task of the futural “creative ones” is to become
“stewards of the stillness of the passing by of the last
god” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 232)—staying open
to whether that passing by is to be an approach or a
continuing withdrawal.
Heidegger, on the potential of a “last god”
for “the renewal of the world out of the saving of
the earth” (Heidegger, 1938/2012, p. 325)—and
in a late interview saying “only a god can save us
now” (Neske & Kettering, 1990, p. 57)—could not
have anticipated the full extent of what would need
saving in our emerging ecological crisis of manmade global warming, with its potential population
displacements, mass starvation, and increasing
social/economic disparities. In that light one might
better anticipate his “last god” in terms of Gaia—
in the sense of Lovelock’s (2009) understanding
of planet and eco-systems as ultimately nurturant
equilibrating organism. Some such return of deity
as “Great Mother” would fit with 1) the original
female/maternal origins of tribal shamanism
(Tedlock, 2005) and the maternal deities of early
agricultural societies (Vycinas, 1961, 1990). 2) The
“maternal” metaphoricity of Heidegger’s “giving”
and “sheltering”—a Winnicottian “holding”
as a nurturing of the planet. 3) the developing
world-wide revolution of feminism, with its more
collaborative approach to social institutions. A
confluence of ecological crisis, issues of social
and gender justice, and the spiritual authenticity of
“indigenous peoples—that true “first beginning”—
may be what finally re-sacralizes the planet itself as
Gaia (Hawken, 2007). Heidegger’s invitation to this
sort of re-imagining of humanity remains open.
Hunt

Conclusions
hat then would be the longer term “prospects”
of Heidegger’s Other Beginning—as a
spiritual New Age for future centuries?
In some form, if such as Heidegger, Jung,
Toynbee, Weil, Reich, Gurdjieff, and Maslow are
right on the inherency of spirituality to the human
condition, it eventually becomes inevitable. It
would be the full re-newal on a planetary level
of the primacy of a social-personal intelligence
of meaning and purpose, as the superordinate
context for the “intelligence of things”—no matter
how sophisticated the digitalizing of the latter. For
Toynbee (1957) it was this larger contextualizing
that defined the major civilizations of the past—
certainly not in the sense of any “utopia” or
human “perfection,” but rather as the optimal
attainable balance and integration for an inherently
unbalanced, strife ridden humanity (see also Hunt,
2009).
What would be the initiating focus for such
a planetary re-balancing? On the level of individual
research by far the most common precursor
of spontaneous peak or ecstatic experiences is
extreme personal crisis, with the settings of nature
and meditation following in order (Taylor, 2013).
This is also consistent with Simone Weil (1947/2002)
on the fullest experiences of redemptive grace as
following the greatest “afflictions”—with their “soul
destroying despair” and final surrender to the “hole”
of that suffering. It is also well reflected by Heidegger
(1942/1996, p. 134) discussing Hölderlin—on the
edge of psychosis—as “annihilated” in the “fire
from the heavens.” On the collective level then, one
would have to posit any precursor to Heidegger’s
“last god” as the sort of planetary wide afflictions
so widely predicted now in our dawning ecological
crisis—mediated and guided perhaps, following
Taylor, by a developing neo-shamanic appreciation
of nature and increasingly widespread meditative
practices.
One of course fears the literalization
through actual collective disaster of Heidegger’s
new uncanny of “unsettlement” and loss of a
“dwelling.” While the contemplation of such a
globalization of collective misery is itself deeply
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unsettling, there is at least some indication that
Weil’s cycle of affliction and grace can also occur
on the level of larger society as well. Rebecca Solnit
in her A Paradise Built in Hell (2009) reviews the
history of spontaneous communal response to the
major disasters of earthquakes, tornadoes, mass
fires, and floods. Rather than letting loose some
Hobbsian anarchy, a first response has most often
been the spontaneous arising of a communal
coming together in mutual assistance and shared
responsibility—a shared guardianship and sheltering
of grace and generosity. Those involved later recall
shared ecstatic and peak experiences in the midst
of their response to truly awful events—states of
being that are consistent with Maslow (1962) on the
“being-values” of strength, will, and compassion
and Almaas (1988) on “personal essence.”
Solnit’s findings are perhaps some of the
strongest empirical evidence of a spiritual essence
of the human condition. The widely foreseen
disasters of a fast approaching planetary future
would accordingly not be the end, and it would be
their aftermath that the later Heidegger was already
addressing as Other Beginning.
Notes
1. It should be noted that these comparisons of
Heidegger with such as Jung, Reich, Weber,
Weil, Toynbee, Sorokin, or William James would
have been anathema to him—especially given
his forceful rejections of anything resonant with
psychologism, neo-Marxism, and traditional
approaches to “mystical consciousness.”
However, hindsight has inevitably relativized
the competing ideologies of those times, and it
is their independent confluence that now seems
so striking.
2. Almaas (1988) also distinguishes another level
of spiritual transformation in sense of self that
he terms “personal essence” or the “pearl.”
It is very close to much of Maslow’s (1962)
original discussion of “self-actualization,” with
both describing a uniquely personal synthesis
of autonomy and nurturance/compassion—and
conceptually it is also related to Heidegger’s
“authenticity” of “care.” For Almaas the
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failure to develop personal essence makes the
spiritual path more likely to become distorted
by its various “metapathologies” (Almaas, 1988;
Maslow, 1962; Wilber, 1984) or what James
(1902) termed “theopathies.” Biographical
depictions of Heidegger (below) show a personal
narcissism that would have made him especially
vulnerable to the metapathological inflation and
grandiosity of his National Socialist period.
3. While the early Heidegger would derive his
analysis of Dasein from his “naturalizing” of
Christianity, Scheler (1923/1960) worked more
directly from Otto’s numinous and its religious
schematization as an ethics of human sympathy.
By the later 1930s Heidegger had gradually imported the Scheler/Otto language of numinous
feeling into his more cognitive-noetic Being.
4. It has indeed been tempting to see a core
perennialism in the “Axial” emergence of the
major world mysticisms in Greece, China, India,
and the Near East, as also in the striking similarities of the independent world wide shamanisms
of tribal peoples. While one might be able to
argue that certain spiritual traditions are more
deep structure “near,” as maximally complete
expressions of the multiple dimensions of the
numinous, it is also true that such commonalities
will also reflect a necessary “interactionism” with
the shared socio-economic conditions common
to Toynbee’s (1957) “universal states” that
generated these overlapping Axial mysticisms,
as well as across hunter gatherer societies and
their similar shamanic practices.
5. Thus from Heidegger’s perspective Siegel’s
(2005) demonstrations of a wide range of
animals repeatedly seeking incapacitating selfintoxications with hallucinogenic and fermented
plants would attest less to Siegel’s “fourth drive”
for “altered states of consciousness” than a more
ordinary manifestation of novelty motivation.
Examples of awe-like behaviors and what look
like uncanny emotion in chimpanzees resonating
aesthetically to wind and flowing water (Bering,
2002) may indeed show a nidus of Otto’s
numinous, but are confined to specific situations
and lack the repeated ritual expressions,
prolonged trance-like absorptions by individuals
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and groups, and response to the entirety of
one’s surroundings, all essential to the intrinsic
creativity of human mystical states. There seems
to be no such thing as chimpanzee shamanism.
6. The pioneering social psychologist George
Herbert Mead (1934, 1932/2002), who has
been compared to both Heidegger and
Dilthey on the primacy of social context for
all human knowledge (Barash, 2003), saw the
inter-relation of all discoveries in the multiple
physical sciences as not only generated out of
a social and historical matrix but as themselves
engaged in their own implicit “society,” based
on a “taking the role of the other” toward each
other. The “facts” of multiple disciplines thus
constitute their own society, a bit like Mead’s
notion of a baseball team with its various codefining “positions.”
7. The large and controversial literature on their
affair, their post-war renewal of friendship, her
final forgiveness of his Nazi Rectorship, and her
help in overseeing the translation and publication
of his later work in English—and whether for
Heidegger himself this was mostly about reclaiming a damaged international reputation—is
beyond the scope of this essay (Ettinger, 1995;
Grunenberg, 2017; Maier-Katkin, 2010). They
did agree they had been the loves of each others
lives, and Arendt continued to regard him as
the seminal philosopher of modernity. Where
Heidegger took Being and Time in the direction
of a futural planetary spirituality, she developed
it into her own philosophy of civic responsibility
(Arendt, 1978; Maier-Katkin, 2010).
8. Elfride Heidegger, who remained a committed
Nazi ideologue and deeply anti-semitic,
apparently told the son, Hermann, the truth of
his birth when he was fourteen—the same year
Heidegger resigned his Rectorship. She pledged
her son to tell “nobody” while she lived except
for his future wife. He writes of this in a short
afterword to his father’s letters, saying that the
secret had been “a burden that has weighed
upon and tormented me for seventy-one years”
(Heidegger, G., 2008, p. 317). This inevitably
leaves the reader uncertain whether the nobody
and its “torment” meant that he may not have
Hunt

been told that his father already knew, who in
fact had long accepted him as his son—a son
who became an academic historian and the
administrator of his father’s archives. Otherwise
the “torment” seems less obvious. Make of it all
what one will.
9. Current speculations in some A.I. circles
(Chalmers, 2010) about a digital “singularity,”
to somehow inevitably develop out of the
necessity to administer and control the ever
more complex systems of society, economics,
and science on a global basis, offer the perfect
emblem for Heidegger’s insight into technology
as run-away machination and will-to-power.
It does not have to be true or even remotely
possible to evoke this same sense of the new
uncanny. What has been less remarked is the
way such a “singularity” comes to mirror in
digitalized form the traditional Judeo-Christian
God, with its omniscience, omnipotence, and
hoped for ultimate benevolence—as though the
fantasies of technology must come to address
and symbolically resolve the “disenchantment”
of its own emptiness. That crossing of amplified
personhood and ultimate computer is uncanny.
10. Bambach (2003) and others (Wolin, 1990)
persist in seeing Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin’s
“fatherland” poetry as a direct continuation
of National Socialist propaganda of “blood
and soil.” Yet, while certainly reflecting a
conservative romanticism of folklore and rural
life, the absence of any language of race and
nationalism in Heidegger’s language would
seem to reflect his move past National Socialism
into something considered here as a kind of
regionalized neo-shamanism. Despite Hitler’s
own mythologizing of Volk, and the tendency
of some neo-romantic thinkers to be drawn to
such revivalism, it is in itself no more “fascist”
than a concern with workers’ rights and class
inequalities makes one “communist.” Of course
for Wilhelm Reich, a New Age thinker in these
same years, it did (see Hunt, 2018a), and for
much longer than Heidegger’s infatuation with
National Socialism, but in both cases there
followed the stepping back to something more
foundational.
Heidegger's Phenomenology of Numinous Experience

11. Vincent Vycinas (1990), a Heidegger scholar and
native Latvian, attempted this kind of regional
sacralization of the “foursome” for Baltic or
Aistian regions, based on pre-Christian and preRoman survivals of a great goddess marsh-land
ecology and its local mythologies—including
ancient traditions of a primary maternal
responsibility for hearth-fire and sacred house
serpent.
12. To return to the phenomenology of consciousness Heidegger sought to complete, Heidegger’s
sense of his Other Beginning as a pre-dawn
“glow” still occluded within the First Beginning
is also resonant with accounts from Tibetan
Buddhism of a “luminous darkness” or “light
of the void” latent within the more expansive
luminosities of intensity ecstasy (Guenther, 1984).
It is also consistent with early introspectionist
tachistoscope research that distinguished a predimensional “spread” and indefinable glow at
the briefest screen exposures, which can only
be gradually detected with numerous repetitions
“beneath” the more obvious “kick of light” that
emerges out of it (Bichowski, 1925; Dickinson,
1926). Otto, William James, and Heidegger
were all influenced by Schleiermacher,
1799/1988; Marina, 2004) who understood
mystical experience as the felt amplification of
the inner form of the unfolding moment—what
would now be termed the amplified expression
of the moment by moment “microgenesis” of
immediate consciousness out of its impalpable
sense of synesthetically based felt meaning
(Hunt, 1984, 1995, 2011).
13. This “turning back” that illuminates the Clearing
as Inceptual Being—an opening of Da-sein to
the “shining back” of Being—shows Heidegger
on similar metaphoric ground as G. H. Mead’s
(1934) social “taking the role of the other” toward
oneself—and Frederic Bartlett’s (1932) cognitive
psychology of “turning around on the schemata”—as the uniquely human capacity for turning
around on the inner forms of experience. For
Mead this opens up the unrepresentable spontaneously creative “I” and Generalized Other—
whose maximum amplifications become “soul”
and “God.” From the view, however, of HeidegInternational Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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ger’s radical phenomenology, the problem with
Mead’s and Bartlett’s versions of this unique
“reflexivity” of human mind would be that it is
inevitably based within the “process” language
of “explaining” in terms of the “already familiar,”
and so occludes the resulting sense of wonder
and awe emergent from the deep structures of
consciousness—losing the implicit phenomenology from which these concepts would have
been initially derived (Heidegger, 1935/2014, pp.
225–227).
14. Anthony Newberg (2016), in outlining a
prospective “neurotheology” based on the
contemporary neuroscience of meditation and
psychedelic drugs, similarly stresses that the
neuro-chemical induction of mystical states does
not in itself establish a causal reductionism of
mind to matter or refute any traditional spiritual
understandings of such experience. While the
brain is often viewed in terms of linear causal
process, it is as better understood as a mediator
or conduit that enables the resonant interface of
organism and environment. For the psychologist
of ambient perception James Gibson (1979) such a
linear “causation” is entirely subordinated within
the larger context of the circle of continuous self
location of organism within its ambient array—
concrete and symbolic. On the human level of
symbolic intelligence that mirroring resonance
will apply equally to a central nervous system
“capable” of both mathematics and God, since
the same root metaphors seem required for both
(Hunt, 1995, 2006).
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